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Ethics: Professionalism,
Craft, and Failure
By JAMES R. ELKINS*
I. PROFESSIONALISM: TiE STANDARD ACCOUNT
Professionals shape and structure our understanding of hu-
man experiences. Physicians attend to illness and, through "med-
ical notions" of curing and healing, implicitly shape our
understanding of health.' Efforts to rid ourselves of disease and
illness, or at least their symptoms, are mediated by the physician
and the practice of medicine within hospitals. Lawyers draft our
wills and contracts and represent us in trials. More importantly,
lawyers provide the framework within which our understanding
and perception of conflict, fairness, equality and social justice
take on personal meaning. Claims to justice are filtered through
the prism of law and legal practice. Conflicts and attendant
concerns about rights and duties are adjudicated with the help
of lawyers in the "theatre of adversity" we call trials.
In structuring and defining human experience, the profes-
sions play an integral role in the delineation of experience as
good/bad, healthy/sick, or legal/illegal. It is in this shaping,
this normative rendering of experience, that professions take on
a moral/ethical perspective.
It is difficult, and perhaps futile, to talk about social values
such as justice and health without reference to those individuals
who make their life's work administering to such concerns. In
the world of medicine and physicians, and in the world of law
and lawyers, there develops a highly refined sense of mission,
* Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
See generally W. ARNEY & B_ BERGEN, MEDICINE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF
LIVING: TAMING THE LAST GREAT BEAST (1984).
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practice and social utility, a sense which we have come to call
"professionalism."
This essay focuses on one part of the "culture of
professionalism" 2-the moral/ethical dimension of professional
life-and how our sense of professional ethics, particularly legal
ethics, is shaped and deformed by what might be called the
standard account of professionalism. The essay suggests that
contemporary notions of professional ethics among lawyers and
in legal education parallel the theory of professionalism drawn
from the literature on the sociology of professions.3 This "sense
of professionalism" strongly influences the social and political
aspects of professional work and provides a ready-made struc-
ture within which the "felt-experience" of professional life can
be organized. The lawyer's (and law student's) sense of profes-
sionalism becomes a rather prominent part of the lawyering
ethos, an ethos which lays claim to the belief that professional
work is guided by an ethical sentiment which protects the public
and ensures that the profession acts in the public interest.
Professionalism is a feature of the lawyer's world-view4 be-
cause it is a set of fundamental beliefs which provides a frame
- See generally B. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1978).
When lawyers and law teachers attempt to explain the nature of the legal
profession they inevitably turn to sociological accounts. See, e.g., McKay, The Future
of Professional Independence for Lawyers, in THm LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPEND-
ENCE 39, 40 (ABA 1984).
One commentator has argued that it is the lawyer's "dislike of vague generalities,
the preference for case-by-case treatment of all social issues, the structuring of all possible
human relations into the form of claims and counterclaims under established rules, and
the belief that the rules are 'there' that constitute a legalistic world view." See J.
AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 10 (1976). Similarly,
[w]hen we accuse someone of being legalistic, we suggest an excessive zeal
for purely formal details which becloud rather than clarify the real issue.
The legalist is someone who is lost among the trees and cannot or will not
consider the overall shape of the forest. So it is a sense of willful closure
together with an obsession for procedure and minutiae that we associate
with the law game.
S. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL
CHANGE 153 (1974) (emphasis in original). See also J. SHKLAR, LEGALISM 1 (1964) (arguing
that legalism has a moral/ethical dimension); R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS 75
(1975) (legalism described as "a way of thinking about social life, a mode of conscious-
ness").
Legalism has come under increasing criticism for "its role in maintaining oppres-
sive social conditions and for [its] exceeding narrowness ... as a world view." D'Errico,
The Law Is Terror Put Into Words, in 2 LEARNING AND THE LAW 39, 40 (1975-76). On
the conservative nature of legalism, see Wasserstrom, Postscript: Lawyers and Revolu-
tion, 30 U. PITT. L. REV. 125, 129 (1968-69).
For a discussion of legalism in legal education, see J. AUERBACH, supra, at 276;
Elkins, A Humanistic Perspective in Legal Education, 62 NEB. L. REV. 494, 509-13
(1983).
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of reference and an orientation for day-to-day decisions in the
practice of law. Professionalism conveys a sense of how work is
to be done in the most pragmatic sense. At the same time the
lawyer's world-view serves as an ideology-that is, the funda-
mental tenets and basic assumptions which provide a "deep
structure" for professional practice, a structure which operates
in much the same fashion as grammar does for language.5 Ide-
ology is that part of our belief system that lies beyond question.
The power of an ideology over professionals comes from the
fact that its underlying tenets and assumptions are taken for
granted and go unexamined. 6
In the ideology of professionalism, more is better. If the
profession is in trouble because individual lawyers provide in-
adequate services, misrepresent their clients, or abuse their re-
sponsibility through incompetence and negligence, then the cure
is greater professionalism. If the profession is in trouble because
it promotes the interest of the individual, pays too little attention
to community and society, and ignores the harm that individuals
are willing to perpetrate in pursuit of their own self-interest,
then the cure is greater professionalism. How we are to resolve
what are clearly social issues by more professionalism is unclear.
A fundamental tenet of professionalism is that an individu-
al's failure to adhere to the highest standards or to adequately
take into account the social and philosophical dimensions of his
or her professional work is personal and idiosyncratic to that
individual. Whenever larger numbers of professionals persist-
ently act in a way that calls attention to the profession, they
hear a call for more stringent standards or regulatory efforts to
secure compliance with existing standards and norms.
For an account of ideology in the professional life of the lawyer, see Simon,
The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L.
REv. 29.
While "the legal view is no more narrowing than any other unidimensional
explanation of the world, [it is] more deluding than some world views [because of] its
covert character." SCHEINOLD, supra note 4, at 161-62. More specifically,
lI]aw professors and lawyers do not believe that they are either encumbered
or enlightened by a special view of the world. They simply feel that their
legal training has taught them to think logically. In a complex world, they
have the intellectual tools to strip a problem, any problem, down to its
essentials.
Id. at 161.
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These notions of professionalism are closely related to what
might be called a "standard account" of professions found in
sociological literature. 7 We begin with the fundamental notion
that the practice of law is not simply an occupation: to become
a lawyer is to become a member of a profession. From sociol-
ogists, and from our own personal experience, we learn that
professionals are granted special status in contemporary society,
and that professionals frequently acquire prestige, status and
power. It follows that being a professional, and being seen by
others as a professional, significantly influences the way we see
ourselves and the way we work. Professional work is desirable
in contemporary society, both for the status that one gains and
for the sense that one is doing something worthwhile for others
and for oneself.
A profession requires its initiates to undergo rigorous train-
ing whereby they learn a body of knowledge and develop the
skills to apply that knowledge in order to solve problems and
help those who utilize their services." Professionals are thought
to have a superior understanding because of their formal edu-
cation which focuses on a limited area of knowledge and is
The sociological account of the professions was first explored by Talcott Parsons
nearly a half century ago. See Parsons, The Professions and Social Structure, 17 Soc.
FORCES 457 (1939). The subsequent literature has not varied substantially from Parsons'
original work. See, e.g., E. FRIEDSON, THE PROFESSION OF MEDICINE (1970); E. HUGHES,
MEN AND THEIR WORK (1958); Cogan, Toward a Definition of Profession, 23 HARV.
EDUC. REV. 33 (1953); Goode, Community Within a Community: The Professions, 20
AM. Soc. REV. 194 (1957); Goode, Encroachment, Charlatanism, and the Emerging
Profession: Psychology, Medicine, and Sociology, 25 AM. Soc. REV. 902 (1960); Green-
wood, Attributes of a Profession, 2 Soc. WORK 44 (1957); Wilensky, The Profession-
alization of Everyone?, 70 AM. J. Soc. 137 (1964).
Parsons and other sociologists have focused on the legal profession. See, e.g., T.
PARSONS, A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession, in ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL
THEORY 370-85 (1954); Heinz & Laumann, The Legal Profession: Client Interests,
Professional Roles, and Social Hierarchies, 76 MICH. L. REV. I111 (1977-78).
In recent years, a body of literature which is more critical of the professions than
the traditional sociological accounts has emerged. See, e.g., B. BLEDSTEIN, supra note
2, at 334; M. LARSON, THE RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1977). The critical perspective has
also focused on the legal profession. See, e.g., J. AUERBACH, supra note 4; J. NOONAN,
PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW (1976); S. SCHEINGOLD, supra note 4.
" It has been suggested that the student learns more than a body of knowledge
and a world-view, she also learns her place in the social hierarchy. See Kennedy, Legal
Education as Training for Hierarchy, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE
40-61 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). See also Pickard, Experience as Teacher: Discovering the
Politics of Law Teaching, 33 U. TORONTO L.J. 279 (1983).
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joined with training and experience in the utilization of that
body of knowledge. Professions are charged with the responsi-
bility of ensuring the quality of their work and ensuring that
members of the group act, as best they can, in the public interest.
As a reflection of this social responsibility, the profession pro-
mulgates standards of performance and enumerates the duties
of the professional. These standards and duties are embodied in
an "ethical code" which serves as a sign of responsibility to
those outside the profession, as a guide to normative conven-
tions, and as an objective standard for sanctioning the wayward. 9
The practice of law has for many years been the sole province
of professionals. Professionals impress upon the public the view
that technical and ethical problems within their realm of exper-
tise must be treated only by those who have received appropriate
certification. 0 Certification comes only after the aspirant has
completed the training and education necessary to master the
body of knowledge and skills associated with the discipline. By
assuming the responsibility for certification, licensing and pol-
icing against unauthorized practice of the profession's skills, the
profession by governmental and social sanction controls the
training programs, certification procedures, and mechanisms for
regulation and punishment. Consequently, the mark of profes-
" For a critique of professional ethics codes, see Teschner, Lawyer Morality, 38
GEo. WASH. L. REV. 789, 790-99 (1969-70). On the relationship of the lawyer's ethical
code to the making of moral decisions, see Essay: Three Discussions of Legal Ethics,
126 U. PA. L. REv. 452 (1977-78). See also Flynn, Professional Ethics and the Lawyer's
Duty to Self, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 429, 442 (arguing that to treat the Code of Professional
Responsibility as describing the lawyer's ethical duties retards a student's ethical devel-
opment); Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 702 (1977); Note, The Lawyer's Moral Paradox, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1346-49.
," The legal profession justifies this view as follows:
The prohibition against the practice of law by a layman is grounded in the
need of the public for integrity and competence of those who undertake
to render legal services. Because of the fiduciary and personal character of
the lawyer-client relationship and the inherently complex nature of our
legal system, the public can better be assured of the requisite responsibility
and competence if the practice of law is confined to those who are subject
to the requirements and regulations imposed upon members of the legal
profession.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MODEL
CODE]. See also Cheatham, Availability of Legal Services: The Responsibility of the
Individual Lawyer and of the Organized Bar, 12 UCLA L. REv. 438, 439 (1964-65)
("The condemnation of the unauthorized practice of law is designed to protect the
public from legal services by persons unskilled in the law.").
ETHICS
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sions and professional work is autonomy., Independence of
judgment is a mark of integrity in professional life.' 2
Autonomy affords practitioners the opportunity to express
and to take responsibility for a social and political vision of the
world, to reflect concerns which extend beyond the immediate
problem. While the possibility for expression of social and po-
litical concerns exists, the exercise of the possibility is limited,
often rather severely, by competing professional norms. 3 As a
profession we have not celebrated the efforts of some among us
to hold themselves out as "public interest" lawyers. There is, at
present, no shared consensus within the profession as to when
lawyering is in the public interest.
To be autonomous in one's work and to have status within
society helps the individual account for and learn to accept the
feelings of self-worth which go along with membership in a
profession. Just as the standard account of professionalism me-
diates our vision of ourselves as social and political actors, it
provides a prism through which an individual lawyer can see
oneself, both as a professional and as a person with concerns
and hopes which extend beyond professional life.
" One attorney's recent statement demonstrates a high, perhaps obsessive regard
for autonomy: "The professional independence of the lawyer has, since early Rome
I been considered a keystone of any system of justice .... The professional inde-
pendence of the practicing lawyer is the single most important element in providing the
legal profession with its strength, character, and integrity." Brown, The Decline of
Lawyers' Professional Independence, in THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE 23,
24 (ABA 1984).
" See id. The MODEL CODE admonishes attorneys to exercise "independent profes-
sional judgment" on their clients' behalf. See MODEL CODE Canon 5 (1979).
The professional judgment of a lawyer should be exercised, within the
bounds of the law, solely for the benefit of his client and free of compro-
mising influences and loyalties. Neither his personal interests, the interests
of other clients, nor the desires of third persons should be permitted to
dilute his loyalty to his client.
MODEL CODE at EC 5-1.
" See, e.g., MODEL CODE EC 8-6:
While a lawyer as a citizen has a right to criticize [adjudicatoryl officials
publicly, he should be certain of the merit of his complaint, use appropriate
language, and avoid petty criticisms, for unrestrained and intemperate
statements tend to lessen public confidence in our legal system. Criticisms
motivated by reasons other than a desire to improve the legal system are
not justified.
Id. See also ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 192 (1939)
("[A]n attorney holding public office should avoid all conduct which might lead the
layman to conclude that the attorney is utilizing his public position to further his
professional success or personal interests.").
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That society is ambivalent about the status and prestige of
lawyers serves only to reinforce the lawyer's stalwart resolve to
maintain status in the face of a public that misunderstands the
nature of professionals' work. The public's lack of understand-
ing is attributed to its lack of knowledge and its inability to see
that professionals adhere to values which non-professionals con-
fuse with self-interest. The standard account of professionalism
would have us believe that others can neither truly understand
nor evaluate our work, and consequently, that they can never
overcome their ambivalence about the status that we have in
society.
Professionalism makes possible the belief that professionals
make the world work, if they do not in fact make it a better
place to live. Lawyers tend to view themselves as making a
contribution to society, whatever their political or social per-
spective. The effect of the ideological underpinnings of profes-
sionalism is that those who practice law claim that their work is
by its nature, in and of itself, a contribution to society. The
standard account of professionalism supports and reinforces, if
it does not actually promote, the belief that all professionals as
a group preserve and promote the social welfare.
Professionalism encourages the belief, at least among profes-
sional elites, that the profession is vitally concerned about the
moral/ethical dimension of professional practices. The social
justification for professional autonomy and self-regulation is
that there is an "ethics" which guides our practice. We give
notice to the world that we are governed by the "higher calling"
of professionalism' 4 and evidence that notion by the voluntary
imposition of standards upon ourselves. Our concern for the
moral/ethical dimension of professional practice is thought to
be shown in the existence of an "ethical code."
There is nothing dramatic and little that is new in this
"sociological account" of the professions. And yet, this view of
the professions mirrors so completely what we have come to
think of as ethics in the professions. Sociology has not only
provided us with an account of the social organization of law-
yers, but more significantly, the sociological account has become
11 The idea of law as a "calling" can be a way of getting beyond narrow concep-
tions of professionalism. See, e.g., Bresnahan, Theology and Law: A Deeper Under-
standing of Vocation, 7 CAP. U.L. REV. 25 (1977-78).
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a view that we use to justify ourselves and our work to others,
and to ourselves. The sociological account gains currency then,
not only among sociologists who study the professions, but in
the profession, among professional elites, and among those who
constitute the practicing bar.
II. AN ETHICS OF PROFESSIONALISM
One of the significant developments in education in the last
decade has been the focus on values and ethics. Professional
schools do not exist in a social vacuum; consequently, law schools
have begun to require "legal ethics" as a part of the curriculum.
Further, there has been substantial concern within the legal
profession as to the nature of legal ethics and how it can best
be taught to students. "5 But what does the concern mean? Does
it demonstrate the commitment of the legal profession and legal
educators to make the moral/ethical dimension of professional
life an integral part of legal education? The current interest in
ethics in the professions is best understood by taking a closer
look at what is meant by "applied ethics" and how it embraces
the standard account of professionalism derived from sociology.
All of this talk about ethics tends to take a particular form:
our talk about ethics in law and professional life is an ethics in
service of professionalism. It will be my argument that legal
ethics must free itself from the standard account of profession-
alism. There is little impetus to do that so long as profession-
alism is viewed as an unmitigated good both for the individual
and for society. When the notion of professionalism is sacro-
sanct, as it is today, we have difficulty imagining an ethics
divorced from the standard account.
The sociological description of professionalism suggests that
an ethical mandate is fundamental to the very concept of a
profession. Lawyers cannot escape ethics because ethics lies at
" See note 19 infra. If ethics is to be applied, then it must be taught and learned.
The recent interest in "applied ethics" reflects a new emphasis on values and ethics in
education. See EDUCATION AND VALUES (D. Sloan ed. 1980); ETHICS TEACHING IN HIGHER
EDUCATION (D. Callahan & S. Bok eds. 1980). See generally HASTINGS CENTER, THE
TEACHING OF ETHICS IN HIGHER EDUCATION (1980).
The notion that ethics is a special field of study, a discipline with its own language,
body of knowledge and methodology, has been encouraged by a recent report on ethics
in higher education. See HASTINGS CENTER, supra.
[Vol. 73
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the core of professionalism. We may disguise ethics in the name
"professional responsibility," in the law of lawyering,' 6 or in
professional malpractice, but it is ethics nonetheless. When we
talk about ethics, including legal ethics, we are talking about
professionalism.
The idea of "applied ethics" looks substantially different in
law than in medicine. In medicine, ethics provides the basis for
debate and dialogue about the role of the physician, about the
physician-patient relationship, and about the role of physicians
and of medicine in the broader philosophical" and spiritual",
worlds that we inhabit. In the legal profession our sense of
applied ethics has been substantially more constricted. We have
indeed recognized the obligation to teach something called "legal
ethics,' 1 9 but we misconstrue the obligation as a duty simply to
convey information and knowledge about the ethical code of
professional practice. The view that legal ethics is the study of
an ethical code or a study of the law of lawyering is a perfect
example of how the ideology of professionalism transforms eth-
ics so that it supports traditional approaches to lawyering instead
of becoming the basis for a critical perspective on lawyering. In
actual practice, the ethics that gets applied is an ethics of profes-
sionalism, an ethics that buttresses and reinforces existing views
of the lawyer as a Sophist, as a "hired gun" who disregards the
harm perpetrated in the name of professionalism. At best, the
ideology of professionalism promotes reform while legitimating
an entire structure of normative conventions that are only nom-
inally related to ethics.
When we look for an ethics to apply in law, we tend not to
reach out very far. It is not ethics in the sense of a general,
11 A blatant and arguably outrageous example is L. PATTERSON, LEGAL ETHICS:
THE LAW OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1982).
I- The literature suggests that medical ethics has a stronger philosophical founda-
tion than does legal ethics. See, e.g., R. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS (1981);
Hunt & Arras, Ethical Theory in the Medical Context, in ETHICAL ISSUES IN MODERN
MEDICINE 1, 1-48 (1977); Romanell, Medical Ethics in Philosophical Perspective, in
HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVES IN MEDICAL ETHICS 23-38 (1972).
See J. NEEDLEMAN, THE WAY OF THE PHYSICIAN (1985).
The literature on pedagogy and legal ethics is extensive. For a succinct review
of the history of ethics in the law school curriculum, see M. KELLY, LEGAL ETHICS AND
LEGAL EDUCATION (1980). Pedagogical and philosophical issues in the teaching of legal
ethics are explored in Elkins, Moral Discourse and Legalism in Legal Education, 32 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 11 (1983); Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility:
A Curricular Paradox, 1979 At. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 247 (1982).
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universalized, philosophical ethics that we bring in to apply.
Rather, our present application is of a more limited, bastardized
version of ethics, an ethics culled from the ethos of profession-
alism. It is not the ethics known by philosophers and theologi-
ans, 20 but an ethics of ethos, an ethics formed from the normative
conventions and practices of those who do professional work.
It is an ethics of work rather than an ethics of craft.
"Applied ethics" as transformed by the ideology of profes-
sionalism reflects a routinized, secularized professional training
curriculum in legal education, 2 which in turn reinforces a sim-
plified ethical view of professional life. The focus on knowledge
and training, on professional skills, techniques and strategies,
becomes the basis for a legalistic world-view which in turn is
translated into a form of discourse and a way of life. An
"applied ethics" which promotes professionalism inevitably fails
to convey to those becoming lawyers that something more than
skill and competence is at stake.22
An ethics of professionalism is characterized by its emphasis
on ethical dilemmas and the use of rational, intellectual and
cognitive problem-solving techniques to resolve these dilemmas.
The explication and application of a set of ethical rules and
principles to specific problems make the ethics of professionalism
amenable to those with a legalistic world-view. In the rush to
apply ethics to legal practice we overlook those metaphors and
images closest to our own lives which reveal how the deeper
-" Thomas Shaffer has written extensively on legal and professional ethics from a
theological perspective. See T. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1980);
Shaffer, Christian Lawyer Stories and American Legal Ethics, 33 MERCER L. REV. 877
(1982); Shaffer, Henry Knox and the Moral Theology of Law Firms, 38 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 347 (1981); Shaffer, Christian Theories of Professional Responsibility, 48 S.
CAL. L. REv. 721 (1975).
See Elkins, supra note 4, at 509-13.
One of the few efforts to explore the moral/ethical dimension of lawyering skills
is G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: MATERIALS FOR CLINICAL
INSTRUCTION IN ADVOCACY (1978).
Learning the moral/ethical dimension of lawyering and professional life poses a
special problem-an epistemological problem. But is ethics to be learned the way we
learn to be lawyers? Professional responsibility and ethical lawyering may require some-
thing more than simply knowing about ethics. One commentator has reminded us that
"[u]nder the discipline of unity, knowledge and morality come together. No longer can
we have that paltry 'objective' knowledge so prized by the academic specialists. To know
anything at all becomes a moral predicament." W. BERRY, THE UNSETTLING OF AMERICA:
CULTURE AND AGRICULTURE 47-48 (1977).
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sense of trust,23 caring 4 and love25 can be deformed by the
instrumental and pragmatic concerns of an "applied ethics."
Imagine hunting a fox, at night, by flashlight. You may see
a lot of interesting things, experience surprise or fear, and have
a good time, but it is unlikely that you will see a fox. "Applied
ethics" may be a necessary and good thing, but there is little
reason to delude ourselves with the belief that the light of an
applied ethics course will ever reveal some fox called ethics. We
have a tendency to treat ethics as if it were simply another
source of light, by which we will learn to see in the dark. The
ethics of professionalism dulls our ethical sensibility; it demeans
and deforms by treating ethics as if it were a flashlight to be
used on dark nights. An ethics of professionalism restricts what-
ever impact ethics might have by using it to put a little more
light on our work and to simplify our ethical world by providing
a set of rules that can be applied whenever an "ethical problem"
arises. And we expect an ethics of professionalism will make
possible the rationalization and reconciliation of the many cross-
currents and contradictions that lie at the heart of professional
life.
Professionalism masks the value dimension of particular
practices, stances and goals. It allows the practitioner to take
for granted that representing a diverse clientele with individual
needs and concerns is good and will, at least in some final
accounting, be viewed as serving the best interest of society.
Equally fundamental, professionalism allows the practitioner to
ignore or to leave implicit her social and political vision. If one
has no predisposition to be explicit about the social world in
which one lives, then membership in the legal profession provides
a minimally adequate conception of a good society.
The ideology of professionalism makes it possible to believe
that the practice of law is the embodiment of a moral life.
" On the issue of trust in the attorney-client relationship see Burt, Conflict and
Trust Between Attorney and Client, 69 GEO. L.J. 1015 (1981).
" On the possibility of an ethics of care, see C. GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE
(1981) (suggesting that women's sense of justice differs from that of men and that justice
for women is more a matter of care and relations than of rights and principles). See
also R. PIRSIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE (1974) (on the obstacles
to "caring" in contemporary culture).
" See Leleiko, Love, Professional Responsibility, The Rule of Law, and Clinical
Education, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 641 (1980).
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Consequently, the ideology of professionalism is concerned about
"ethics" only to the extent that it is possible to maintain and
legitimate belief in professionalism. One commentator has ar-
gued that as a result of this belief, lawyers live in a simplified
amoral universe.26 For the most part lawyers do not find it
necessary to engage in constant and daily re-examination of their
practices and purposes, becausa they are professionals. An ethics
of professionalism is an ethics that forgets itself.
The beauty of professionalism, for those who seek to live a
simple moral life, is that self-examination is not required. And
so the ethics of professionalism, left unchallenged by any sense
of ethics beyond that which serves one's sense of professional-
ism, falls short of the widely-espoused philosophical imperative
derived from Socrates (the patron saint of legal education) that
one lead an examined life. 27 Lawyers live in a simplified amoral
universe partly because they are not compelled by the ethics of
professionalism to reflect on whether what they do is good.
Ethics.fuels the hope, and perhaps the illusion that a professional
life is by its very nature an ethical one. An ethics of profession-
alism is an ethics of complacency, a complacency that embraces
the existing professional ethos, an ethos that blinds us to what
we do in the name of truth and justice,
III. BEYOND THE ETHICS OF PROFESSIONALISM
Ethics carries with it a long heritage and offers a mode of
discourse that could provide a new frame of reference within
the legal profession. To reach out and take account of something
called ethics provides an opening for a more critical perspective.
"Applied ethics" is a wonderful opening through which to bring
in the critical reflection on professionalism which social critics
and theorists have developed, As the critiques from outside
gather force, and the internal cracks and strains become more
obvious, the legal profession may find the voice of those who
dissent from an unrestrained adversarial ethic, a voice of reason
that speaks to the future.
2- See Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 Hutni. RTS. i
(1975).
-' Some philosophers in applied ethics do take account of the Socratic dictum
calling for self-examination. See, e.g., E. STEVENS, BUSINESS ETIoCS (1979).
[Vol. 73
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One of the most rudimentary elements in an ethics of care
requires that we stand in the shoes of the other. The most alien
other for an ethics of lawyering is the radical social critic who
calls our professionalism into question and shows how we, as a
profession, present a problem in securing the larger social good.2"
Seeing ourselves as professionals from the perspective of the
radical social critic may not convince anyone to give up the
practice of law or to drop out of law school. But such a
perspective should provide a way of viewing ourselves which
suggests the need for humility rather than the arrogance so
commonly associated with professional life. And if we come to
see ourselves as human beings, to recognize that professionalism
is subject to question, and to accept that our social utility is in
doubt, then we are in a better position to see ourselves doing
the humble job of craftsmen. While we may see ourselves as
doing socially significant work, as devoting our lives to worthy
goals like justice, or ensuring that every man and woman shall
have access to the courts, are we not also like the simple potter
or weaver who tries to make objects that have a functional
beauty?
I propose an alternative conception of ethics, an ethics which
does not attempt to rationalize or justify professionalism. It is
an ethics neither of rules and sanctions, nor of principles and
reasoning, 29 but an ethics of searching, questioning and reflect-
ing. It is an ethics of craft, an ethics attentive to failure as well
as to success.
The ethics that I describe here is grounded in the lives that
we live, lives that include boredom, disenchantment, alienation"'
See generally I. ILLICH, DISABLING PROFESSIONS (1978).
' An ethics of professionalism derived from a framework of reason drives under-
ground the inquiry into values. Inquiries into a discipline's values are discounted on
grounds that objective, rational inquiry is not possible. Values, when viewed from the
standpoint of scientific rationality, are simply "not the kind of entity to which the
conception of rationality is applicable." Berlin, Rationality of Value Judgments, in
NONiOS VII: RATIONAL DECISION 221 (1964).
Conversely, law is arguably no more objective and rational than is ethics. There
is a growing body of literature which suggests that the objectivity of law is indeed an
illusion. See, e.g., W. BISHIN & C. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE AND ETHICS (1972); THE
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE (D. Kairys ed. 1982).
1, For a vivid portrayal of alienation in one lawyer's life, see C. REICH, THE
SORCERER OF BOLINAS REEF 19-47 (1976). See also S. WISHMAN, CONFESSIONS OF A
CRIMINAL LAWYER (1982).
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and "burn-out."'" In contrast to an ethics of rule following, an
ethics of craft returns to those conversations about the value of
a professional life, to those dialogues in which we search for an
ethical stance. To talk about lawyering and professional life
from the value perspective says something about where we stand,
how we experience the world, and how the world of our expe-
rience and professional life takes on moral consequences. I en-
vision an ethics derived from those conversations3 2 and stories
through which we "tell our lives." It is an ethics where conver-
sation, ideals and visions become the basis for a good life. An
ethics rooted in narrative and story,33 in conversation and dia-
logue, is close to the lives that we live and see others living.
An ethics of dialogue is agonizingly slow to emerge, and it
is not applauded by those whose lives are called into question.
Moral discourse engages the professional in conflict and in the
recognition that his views of the world can be problematic, with
harmful consequences to those he seeks to help and to the social
values he believes he promotes.
When we divorce ethics from the standard account of profes-
sionalism, we experience professional life as more difficult, com-
plex and perplexing. Ethics does not, and cannot, simplify or
make life easy. Ethics does not solve problems or "lighten the
load." Greater ethical sensibility is inconsistent with the pleas-
ures of certainty, security and contentment. When we apply
ethics without the protective ideological shield of professional-
ism, we put our ideals and our way of life on the line. We
discover, not clarity, but complexity; not reassurance, but anx-
iety. The ethics of professionalism protects us from the anxiety
" See Gould, "Burnout": Law and Disorder, The Nat'l L.J., Apr. 30, 1984, at
1, col. 1; A. PINES & E. ARONSON, BURNOUT: FROM TEDIUM TO PERSONAL GROWTH
(1981); J. EDELWICH, BURN-OUT: STAGES OF DISILLUSIONMENT IN THE HELPING PROFEs-
SIONS (1980).
'2 Similarly, philosophy can be viewed as a conversation. See R. RORTY, PHILOS-
OPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 170, 371-72, 389-94 (1979). "To see keeping a
conversation going as a sufficient aim of philosophy, to see wisdom as consisting in the
ability to sustain a conversation, is to see human beings as generators of new descriptions
rather than beings one hopes to be able to describe accurately." Id. at 378. Conversation
is "the ultimate context within which knowledge is to be understood." Id. at 389.
" See S. HAUERWAS, From System to Story: An Alternative Pattern for Rationality
in Ethics and Story and Theology, in TRUTHFULNESS AND TRAGEDY 15-39, 71-81 (1977);
S. HAUERWAS, A Story-Formed Community: Reflections on Watership Down, in A
COMMUNITY OF CHARACTER: TOWARD A CONSTRUCTIVE CHRISTIAN SOCIAL ETHIC (1981).
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of choice,3 4 from determining where we stand in regard to the
work we do, and more significantly, from the work which we
believe to be a worthwhile human endeavor.
Any ethics worth pursuing is difficult and demanding. In
applying ethics we get ourselves into that space where our ideals
come into conflict and where choice is necessary. Ethical choice
calls our character into question,35 and this calling into question
perplexes and angers. To apply ethics to our professional work,
we hold up a mirror to our own good intentions. When we look
closely, we are likely to find self-deception 6 and wishful think-
ing.
We are unwilling to view ourselves critically so long as we
can avoid it. There is no small amount of courage involved in
learning the cost of the decisions we make and in discovering
the effect of our views on those who most depend on us for
comfort, help, service and love. Confrontation with oneself makes
our self-deception and delusion obvious. And, as one commen-
tator noted, "[c]ommunities [such as the legal profession] carry
their heroes' point of view, but communities also deceive them-
selves and train their young in the skills of self-deception." 37
Some moral philosophers, particularly existentialists, see choice as the core of
moral existence. Existentialists see "being" as those "projects" which one lives out in
her choices. Michael Maccoby expresses the point in socio-psychological language: "[W]e
must choose who and what we will be and strive toward actualizing innate capacities
for reason and love by overcoming greed and egocentrism, at the same time developing
competencies that are socially productive and talents that are life enhancing." M.
MACCOBY, THE GAMESMAN 241 (1976). See also E. MEEHAN, VALUE JUDGMENT AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE 28 (1969) ("Every human action, including the act of doing nothing
(often the most complex choice of all) implies a value judgment, whether or not the
individual is aware of making it, and in fact even if the person thinks that none has
been made.").
On choice and ethics, see R. NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 294-95 (1981);
S. Ross, THE NATURE OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 97-100 (1973); J. SARTRE, EXISTENTIALISM
AND HUMANISM 28-32 (1948); Stack, Kierkegaard: The Self and Ethical Existence, 83
ETHICS 108 (1972-73). See generally Elkins, The Examined Life: A Mind in Search of
Heart, 30 AMER. J. JURIS. - (1985).
" See Giegerich, The Lawyer's Moral Paradox, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1335, 1355-57.
See generally Hauerwas & Shaffer, Hope in the Life of Thomas More, 54 NOTRE DAME
LAW 569 (1979).
6 See S. HAUERWAS, Self-Deception and Autobiography: Reflections on Speer's
Inside the Third Reich, in Truthfulness and Tragedy 82-98 (1977); G. MURPHY, OUT-
GROWING SELF-DECEPTION (1975).
" Shaffer, Essay: The Moral Theology of Atticus Finch, 42 U. PITT. L. REv. 181,
209 (1981).
ETHICS
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The ethics that I envision is not a fox to be caught in the
net of our legal education courses, the fox called ethics is at
best a mythical beast. Ethics, like the fox, is crafty and elusive.
It will not be easy to get beyond our sense of professionalism
and the standard sociological account of professionals. Ethics,
like the fox, leads in many directions and we may find that we
know less about the beast than we at first thought. It is hard to
admit that we have so much trouble caging this mythical fox
called ethics. Unable to capture it, or forget it, the very core of
our professional identity demands that we not give up the search.
It is easy enough to become disappointed, discouraged and ap-
athetic when we learn that we are not going to see the quarry.
We go on the hunt, but we find no fox.
Ethics might better be imagined not as the fox but as the
hunt. An ethics of talk, dialogue, story and narrative, an ethics
found in the ever-present teaching and learning that comes from
telling our lives is in many ways like the hunt. The idea of ethics
as a never-ending hunt, as the pursuit of ideals which elude us,
is a theme closer to the lives that professionals live. When ethics
is the hunt, then it is our questions rather than our answers, 8
the process rather than the content, that form the basis for a
moral life.
We have followed the fox called ethics and asked whether it
has not led us astray. Ethics is not "out there" in some course
or some ethical code. The fox has eluded us because what we
seek is the essence of the hunt. Although we may imagine ethics
as question, search or hunt, if we peruse the metaphor, ethics
may turn out to be neither fox nor hunt, but the night in which
the hunt takes place.
Legal ethics teachers may view their subject as an ethical
code, the law of lawyering, or an understanding of a professional
ethos. But an "applied ethics" that moves beyond the ethics of
professionalism takes one into that inner subjective world in
which one chooses and in which one sees the illusions and
delusions upon which his professional life is based. If we talk
enough about ethics, will we not find that the resulting sense of
powerlessness to live out what we know to be right takes us into
" "The answers we carry about in our heads are largely meaningless unless we
know the questions which produced them." N. POSTMAN, TEACHING AS A CONSERVING
ACTIVITY 154 (1980).
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the darkness which lies at the heart of professional life? Have
we not followed our metaphor and its image to the point that
we recognize that ethics is a study of the dark side of profes-
sionalism? Before these questions can be answered, it must be
realised that ethics focuses on persons rather than rules, on lives
rather than principles.
IV. AN ETHICS OF CRAFT
The first stage in imagining an alternative to an ethics of
professionalism is to move professionalism off center stage and
to think of our work as craft, as art as well as techne. While
there is much talk of "training" lawyers, we know that profes-
sional work involves far more than that. While the professions
involve practical, technical skills, they are also a life and practice
of craft.3 9 It is in the effort to join the practical and artistic
work of the legal profession that craft becomes an appropriate
and empowering metaphor.
Crafts historically were learned in communities and sup-
ported by a community, so an ethics of craft can be learned
only through community. In craft professions such as law, a
sense of community emerges from the notion that one "belongs"
to the profession and "practices" its discipline. This sense of
community is bounded by common knowledge and skills, and
by a shared understanding that comes from undergoing a rite of
passage with others. 40 Belonging to a community provides the
professional with a sense of being a part of a communal tradition
with accepted ways of doing the work, a customary way of
standing together.4'
What kind of community is the legal profession? What does
it mean to be in such a community? How does the community
" See generally K. LLEWELLYN, JURISPRUDENCE: REALISM IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
(1962).
1' See Elkins, Becoming a Lawyer: The Transformation of Self During Legal
Education, 66 SOUNDINGS 450 (Winter 1983). See also D. LIGHT, The Nature of Profes-
sional Socialization and Its Effects on Practice, in BECOMING PSYCHIATRISTS 308-19
(1980).
11 On finding common ground and standing together, the essays of Wendell Berry,
a Kentucky farmer, poet, essayist, novelist, and cultural and literary critic, are instructive.
See, e.g., W. BERRY, STANDING BY WORDS (1983); W. BERRY, RECOLLECTED ESSAYS
1965-1980 (1981). See also W. BOOTH, MODERN DOGMA AND THE RHETORIC OF ASSENT
(1974).
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support (and undermine) our conversations about the moral/
ethical dimension of a life in law? Vital as it is, community
tends to get lost when we start talking about values.
The urge to form communities and the need to be in a
community is at base an ethical impulse, a movement toward
human togetherness with attendant concerns for others. Without
communities we would have no need for responsibility. The care
for others, and the harm that follows from being with others
forms the "deep structure" of ethics.42
Karl Llewellyn argued eloquently that legal education should
be a foundation for a life in the practice of a craft and that law
itself is a liberal art.
The truth, the truth which cries out, is that the good work,
the most effective work, of the lawyer in practice roots in and
depends on vision, range, depth, balance, and rich humanity-
those things which it is the function, frequently the fortune,
of the liberal arts to introduce and indeed to induce. The truth
is therefore that the best practical training a University can
give to any lawyer who is not by choice or by unendowment
doomed to be hack or shyster-the best practical training,
along with the best human training, is the study of law, within
the professional school itself, as a liberal art.43
While the study of law is rarely viewed today as a study in
the liberal arts, 44 Llewellyn's concern is still viable. The problem
is that we tend to view law more as technical training than as
liberal art. An alternative, one which honors Llewellyn's view
of legal study as a liberal art and yet recognizes the technical
and practical aspects of lawyering, is the image of lawyers' work
as craft.45
1 See C. GILLIGAN, supra note 24; H. NIEBUHR, THE RESPONSIBLE SELF: AN ESSAY
IN CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY (1963).
4' K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 39, at 380.
4 For an excellent demonstration of how the humanities can enrich the study of
law, see J. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1973); J. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR
MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COM-
MUNITY (1984). See generally Elkins, supra note 4, at 494, 498-501.
4' Once there was no divorce between art and craft:
[I]n medieval society, painters and sculptors as well as potters and weavers
were members of craft guilds. A man was a carpenter, a painter, or a
stonemason; his work, his way of life, was central to his identity and
recognized as his means of centering and discovering himself. It was whole;
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The notion of lawyering as craft reflects both the technical
and artistic aspects, as well as the social and personal dimen-
sions, of professional work and life. From the craft perspective,
professional competence lies in the skilled ways in which talents,
knowledge and skills are employed to resolve particular problems
and to express a social/political vision in one's work. A recent
study of corporate managers is illustrative. The study revealed
that those who saw themselves as craftsmen had "a sense of
self-worth based on knowledge, skill, discipline and self-reli-
ance." 46 While the craftsman was interested in success and money,
he was "motivated even more by the problem to be solved, the
challenge of the work itself and his satisfaction [came from]
creating something of quality."
47
An ethics of craft begins with the idea of skill, of knowing
how to do something. In each discipline there develops an array
of skills, abilities and competencies that become associated with
the craft. We assume that lawyers will be able to marshal the
most effective arguments on behalf of particular clients. These
arguments will draw on a thorough understanding of the events
that affect the client's claims, on the body of legal knowledge
that might be applicable, and on the various strategies that can
be employed on behalf of the client. And yet unless there is
something more, these skills and competencies reflect little more
than the service that a lawyer will provide for a fee. The rhetoric
of professionalism has always assured us that there is more to
lawyer's work than competence in the use of specific skills.
To view lawyering as an art-like craft has implications for
the way we envision the skills, knowledge and ethics that we
invoke in the name of professionalism. While autonomy is of
central concern in the ethics of professionalism, mindfulness is
at the heart of an ethics of craft. Mindfulness is reflected in
it was his religion, his relinking with his divine source.
Dooling, Introduction to A WAY OF WORKING at viii (D. Dooling ed. 1979). See also E.
SCHUMACHER, GOOD WORK 122 (1980) ("In the process of doing good work the ego of
the worker disappears. He frees himself from his ego, so that the divine element in him
can become active. Of course, none of this makes sense if we proceed from the basic
presuppositions of materialistic scientism.").
On lawyering as an art, see A. MACLEISH, Art and Law, in RIDERS ON THE EARTH
82-88 (1978).
See M. MACCOBY, THE GAMESMAN: THE NEW CORPORATE LEADERS 43 (1978).
Id. at 45.
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craft as the skill of getting something done right and doing it
well, as opposed to the mere act of completion or just getting
it done. Mindfulness reflects an aesthetic sensibility (good taste)
and an awareness of the consequences of doing work well; it
makes quality the guiding force not only in the work, but in
one's life. 48 The image of the lawyer as a craftsman suggests not
only the ethos and ethics of professionalism with its emphasis
on skills and competence but also a mindfulness-that is, a
quality of doing work in a way that reminds us of the careful,
creative, yet technically-aware craftsman.
Mindfulness means care, awareness and thoughtfulness, but
it is not the same thing as purpose or competence. Purpose and
competence suggest a linear dimension of work and life, purpose
helps us to get from one place to another, from one case and
one client to another. Mindfulness gives feeling and depth to the
client and case at hand. The state of mindfulness gives us pres-
ence in the very moment at which we engage the client, in the
moment of our choice to employ our skill and our knowledge
one way rather than another.
The difference between the two dimensions can be seen as
the difference between competence and care, between knowledge
and awareness, and between efficiency and thoughtfulness. The
difference is one between surface and depth, an ethics of profes-
sionalism as opposed to an ethics of craft. An ethics of craft
gives depth to our sense of professionalism.
We know that educating students in the use of certain skills
does not, in and of itself, lead to professional responsibility and
ethical lawyering. The skills that one uses as a lawyer-inter-
viewing, counseling, negotiating, writing and arguing-all have
a moral dimension. We can talk about the application of these
skills-about how a lawyer interviews and counsels a client, and
negotiates on the client's behalf-not simply in the technical
sense, but in the sense of relating to clients as persons, with
respect for their feelings, autonomy and dignity. To talk about
how skills are to be performed, to develop an ethics of craft as
well as an ethics of professionalism, we must explore the under-
lying meaning and purpose of skills, both for those who have
11 For one of the most engaging accounts of a contemporary life lived around
quality see R. PIRSIG, supra note 24.
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hope that a life of skill is worthwhile4 9 and for those who rely
on us to use skills on their behalf. "Skill, in the best sense, is
the enactment or the acknowledgment or the signature of re-
sponsibility to other lives: it is the practical understanding of
value. Its opposite is not merely unskillfulness, but ignorance of
sources, dependencies, relationships."50
In the mindfulness we exhibit toward skill and in the skill
we make of mindfulness we create an ethical sensibility. This
sensibility is created through the quality of our crafts and by
sharing our craft mindfulness with others.
A. A Person-Centered Ethics of Craft: An Ethics of Humility
To imagine our professional work as craft joins us with
those who work with their hands, those who sculpt, weave and
whittle. In craft work there is a product, and we too often focus
our attention on this end result. Some person stands before the
product, a person who has imagined the result, who has acquired
the skill, who has struggled with making things work, with
failure and with self.
An ethics of craft must evoke an understanding of persons
who make craft, and the mindfulness it entails, a life's work.
We must find a way to imagine professional work as craft so
that it embodies the connection of self and work, of mind and
result. In The Work of Craft,5 Carla Neddleman has produced
a series of meditations on the crafts of pottery, weaving and
woodworking, traditional crafts which on first impression appear
to have little resemblance to lawyering. It is not the commonality
of skills, but the craftsperson's way of thinking about those
skills that makes Needleman relevant to lawyers. Her meditations
are richly suggestive for the craft of professionalism.
Needleman begins her meditations by questioning the rela-
tionship that exists between the work, in this case a pot that she
has made, and herself. Lawyers can similarly ask what it means
to write legal briefs or to argue a case in court. She puts the
point directly:
*' See Hauerwas and Shaffer, supra note 35, at 569.
W'IW. BERRY, supra note 22, at 91.
C. NEEDLEMAN, THE WORK OF CRAFT (1979). For a different approach to the
same end-an embodiment of self in work-see A. MASLOW, EUPSYCHIAN MANAGEMENT
(1965).
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The question of my craft is the question of myself-Who am
I?-a question the craft can help me to rediscover again and
again....
What does it mean that I undertake to study mysel'....
Perhaps it can mean . . . that I extend myself into the craft,
willing to sacrifice any of my opinions that experience proves
false. I undertake to begin a conversation with the craft, to
listen to it, to be taught by the effort to understand it. Perhaps
through the exchange a richer way of experiencing will begin
to take root in me.5 2
The material we work with in our craft, the craft of law, is not
only the law, our clients and their problems, judges and argu-
ments in courts, but it also includes ourselves. Needleman sees
self, herself, as one material of her craft: "The material, myself,
that I have to work with constantly changes. It has qualities of
clay, glass, metal, wood, wool; it is brittle, flexible, malleable,
obdurate. It is as if the study of being human is the ultimate
craft and all the craft reflections of it." 53
Needleman is in search of the attitude that accompanies
craft, an ethical sensibility that recognizes but is not bound by
a prevailing ethic. In contrast to collective professional atti-
tudes-an ethics bound by ethos-Needleman focuses on how a
person deals with self as she learns and uses craft skills. She
illuminates the "interiority" of professional work, and recog-
nizes how craft and profession are the work of soul. Needle-
man's meditations on craft suggest an ethics with soul, an ethics
that moves the imagination of work from ethos, what everyone
does, to some sense of how I do this work, how the work/craft
emanates from some interior place called "I."
When we shift the emphasis from product to person, from
the explicit work to the implicit feel of it, we find a self, a soul,
at work. Part of what we see, hear and feel is that image of
ourselves at work, of having the mindfulness that goes with
attention to craft. One image that Needleman, as a craftsperson,
'2 C. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 51, at 21, 12-13. See also Dooling, supra note 45,
at vii (suggests craft as a means of integrating human experience).
"' C. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 51, at 12.
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carries with her to the work is an ideal image of herself doing
the work right:
I visualized myself becoming more and more proficient, learn-
ing from my mistakes and producing increasingly more beau-
tiful pots. I imagined that I could be dedicated and serious
and saw myself as if from outside, sitting at the wheel in a
large, orderly studio filled with pottery in various stages of
completion, my head bent in concentration, all my movements
sure and purposeful.14
We are at once more, less and otherwise different from this
idealized image. To see how we are different from the image
one must open oneself to what happens at work, and to the
feelings that accompany the doing: the tension that one feels as
the work begins, the wonder about how one comes to do the
work and how one makes judgments as to when it is acceptable,
the impatience in trying to get it right knowing that there is too
little time, the care and concentration that goes into completing
the work, and finally, the sense of satisfaction with the work
that emerges. It is from this connection with self that craft and
ethical sensibility emerge. Needleman says: "For me this is what
it's like to work at a craft. This is what really takes place." 55
One sees the work and has a moment of honesty, a terribly
short moment when one reevaluates the work and feels discom-
fort. "I sense ... the need to decide whether I'm pleased or
displeased with the pot, pleased or displeased with the way I
worked at making it, pleased or displeased with myself as a
potter, as a person.... ,56 But in order to know how to feel
about the pot, about the work we do, we must know how to
feel about our lives.
Just as we are blinded to the belief system embedded in
professional ethos, craft skills can put one to sleep by the
I ld. at 13.
Id. at 6 (emphasis in original). Another craftsperson describes a similar experi-
ence:
As I work, I try to stay a little free, to watch, listen, feel. The work goes
on and I am with it, but I also try to explore within that. I try to stay
active, immediate, practical. I search for my relationship to the work, to
matter, to the tool, to the hand, to myself, in this moment and no other.
Donner, The Hand and the Tool, in A WAY OF WORKING, supra note 45, at 30.
1 C. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 51, at 5.
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repetition that makes the work into ritual. In pottery, Neddle-
man says, "[c]entering [the clay] can easily be done with the
eyes closed. ' 5 7 It is a ritual. One comes to know how the
centering feels, how the body responds, and how the clay and
the hands react to each other. The ritual can lead to boredom
and fatigue, but it also can "quiet the mind and bring the relaxed
thought to attend to the sensations of the body."5 S The ritual
of craft work makes possible more subtle attention to feelings
such as wonder, happiness, inner peace and healing. 9
B. The Craft of Failure
When we pay attention to ourselves at work and imagine
ourselves as craftsmen, we begin to see and experience the fail-
ures integral to craft. Detachment and alienation, despair and
disenchantment happen to us as professionals. We seem to lose
our sense of self when we become lawyers. We forget our belief
system and our biases and we neglect social justice. These fail-
ures introduce us to the shadowy side of professional life.60 These
pathologies of professionalism have too long remained unnamed.
We pay too little attention to stories of failure in professional
work. Failure is relegated to the study of professional negligence
and the sanctioning of professionals who violate prescribed eth-
ical rules or who engage in criminal conduct. The failures of
professionals are no secret to the public, to those who make use
of our skills. While embarrassment over the professional failure
results in a proliferation of ethics courses, the courses hide as
much as they reveal. We need something beyond "applied eth-
ics." We need to find out where we went astray and what was
forgotten as we became lawyers. It is time to pay close attention
to what ails us. By naming the pathology-the losing, the for-
getting, the detachment and the disenchantment-we point to
" Id. at 8. See generally M. RICHARDS, CENTERING IN POTTERY, POETRY, AND THE
PERSON (1964).
" C. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 51, at 8-9.
"9 Id. at 9-10.
- This side of professionalism is reflected in accounts of its history. See, e.g., B.
BLEDSTEIN, supra note 2. See also LAW AGAINST THE PEOPLE: ESSAYS TO DEMYSTIFY
LAW, ORDER AND THE COURTS (R. Lefcourt ed. 1971); RADICAL LAWYERS: THEIR ROLE
IN THE MOVEMENT AND IN THE COURTS (J. Black ed. 1971); VERDICT ON LAWYERS (R.
Nader & M. Green eds. 1976); WITH JUSTICE FOR SOME: AN INDICTMENT OF THE LAW
BY YOUNG ADVOCATES (B. Wasserstein & M. Green eds. 1972).
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what must be recovered. 6' A sense of craftmanship begins with
humility, limitation and failure.62
But what of the vision and ideals conveyed by a craft-
profession? Do they wither while we search out and work with
our failures? An education in failure does not undermine the
ideal, it honors it: "[N]o ideal is invalidated by anyone's, or
everyone's, failure to live fully up to it .... -63 An education in
professional failure would teach us about craft and how the
ideal vision and the rhetoric of success push us toward the
idealization of technique. Without a sense of failure, craft be-
comes obsessed with technique. 64
Failure is an integral part of craft and the ethos of craft:
There are times when the clay is too hard or too soft,
wedging tires me, .. . and I seem to have forgotten how to
" As women find their way into the world of work there has been a willingness
to explore and name their set-backs, false starts, and failures. See, e.g., WORKING IT
OUT (S. Ruddick & P. Daniels eds. 1977).
"- C. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 51, at 13. Our best efforts may not ward off an
ever lurking sense of failure:
For most of us, our abilities, our good looks and our social techniques-
our pleasant, public-relations hellos, our ability to laugh at anybody's
jokes, our capacity to hold conventional opinions and to never value or
fight for any position in an argument too much-never seem quite adequate
to ward off all the chances of failure.
J. HENRY, ON SHAM, VULNERABILITY AND OTHER FORMS OF SELF-DESTRUCTION 90 (1973).
Similarly, the craftsman
always fails in some degree. Despite his experience, despite the sureness
that he sometimes is able to reach and briefly hold, there is within him,
as he works, a hesitation, a doubt, a fear.. . .This unsureness is necessary
for the growth of both him and his craft. He endeavors to pay no attention
to it but to remain at the boundary of what he must do. He cannot be
certain of what he must do. He cannot be certain of the step until the
movement is completed, until the step is done. He knows that he cannot
know. But he continues with the movement and does not bend to his fear.
Thus he is both master and apprentice in his work.
When he fails, the failure leaves its trace in him and a clearer percep-
tion. The trace remains for a time in his memory....
He continues to have a need for failure. It is the stopping place, the
ultimate reluctance of his effort to continue. As he works, his reluctance
accumulates, his tenseness grows. He fails-and is able to start again.
Remde, Close to Zero, in A WAY OF WORKING, supra note 45, at 54.
" W. BERRY, STANDING BY WORDS, supra note 41, at 100.
Wheft I spoke of pottery in idealist terms of myself as a Potter, I began to hear little
voices telling me it wasn't quite true, and I was ashamed. I had begun to
realize that the obstacles to living the vision were in myself and that they
were not a matter of technique.
C. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 51, at 13.
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throw. I overestimate the strength of the clay and the pot
collapses. The next ball of clay accountably refuses to stick to
the wheelhead. At last it does. I raise it into a cylinder and
begin to shape it only to find a piece of sponge in the wall. I
dig out the sponge and try to patch the hole-to no avail.
Beginning with another ball of clay, I find that I'm using too
much water, an indication to me that I'm not in control of
the clay. I rush to center it, feeling how much time I've wasted,
and have trouble. I don't like the sound of the bearing on the
wheel and there seems to be a wobble at high speeds. I begin
to make the opening before the clay is properly centered and
when I pull it up the top is uneven. I cut it with the needle
and when I pull it up again find I have to cut still more off
the top. There is more clay discarded on the table than there
is on the wheel. I try to breathe evenly and slow down, to
imitate the precise movements of the days when everything
goes right, but it's just an external imitation, no use, an
obvious pretense. I'm aggressive, I attack the clay, can't do
anything right, get tired, dirty, and miserable, produce two
pots I know then and there I'm going to break up tomorrow,
and stop for the day. 65
Needleman is unwilling to dismiss such an event, even though it
is tempting to put it out of mind and concentrate on those days
when all goes well. Such days are embarrassing, but they are
part of the truth of any craft. 66 These days of failure make for
honesty in a craft. They take us back to the beginning, show us
how little we know, and bring a sense of humility, an attitude
which is needed to offset the arrogance so common to profes-
sional work. Arrogance cannot be maintained in the face of
honest admissions that we have days when we fail in our work.
Needleman argues that "[a] craft is, can be, an education in
failure, an education in the attitude toward failure ... - To
study failure we must overcome the "sinking sensation" which
comes with recognition that we have not lived up to an ideal.
Failure teaches. "Failure is a beginning; failure is the spring-
board of hope."' 68 An education in failure is an antidote to the
neurotic success drive:
" C. NEEDLEMAN, supra note 51, at 10-11.
' "[1]sn't the truth of my incompetence and how I react to it just as valuable as
the truth about competence?" Id. at 11.
I Id. at 15.
I'c d.
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[N]eed for success . . . [is] a constrictive force that bars me
from immediate participation in the moment as it appears,
prevents the all-important conversation with the material of
the craft, prevents openness of relationship, prevents a kind
of quickness of response much swifter than the cautions of the
mind. The need for success distorts pleasure, rendering ac-
ceptable only 'materialism,' the 'gimme' approach to every-
thing from a well-made piece of work to a new feeling or
sensation. 69
Failures instruct because they have a way of breaking through
the ritual activity of craft. To experience failure is to recall craft
as a human activity, and to realise how professional skills are
linked to a self that must bridge the gap of doing and being.
We need a phenomenology of failure in professional life.
Every pot is not a good one. But every failure is not an act of
negligence for which the professional should be sanctioned or
punished. We are each responsible and accountable for the fail-
ures which fall short of bad practice. The gray twilight world
of these "responsible failures" calls for a pathologizing of
professional work and professional life.7°
Psychologist James Hillman aruges that pathologizing-stay-
ing close to our failures-reconnects us with soul. 7' Hillman
argues that it is "[w]hen you feel beaten, oppressed, knocked
back ... then something moves and you begin to feel yourself
as a soul."' 72 Hillman suggests that when we fail and feel bad
about our work, there is an opening for soul to come in. And
when you let soul in
you start to stutter or you'll go around in circles or you'll be
unable to elocute it in a way that does justice to it-you will
be in half-darkness .... [The] point is that soul means infe-
" Id. at 16.
It is in this gray area of responsible failures that Charles Bosk's study of surgeons
is illustrative. Bosk asks: "How does the surgeon cope with the knowledge that his
clumsiness, forgetfulness, or tardiness contributed to another's death and/or suffering?
How does the individual surgeon accept this responsibility and yet not shrink from
future action?" C. BOSK, FORGIVE AND REMEMBER: MANAGING MEDICAL FAILURE 4
(1979).
' See J. HILLMAN, ARCHETYPAL PSYCHOLOGY: A BRIEF AccoUNT 37-42 (1983); J.
HILLMAN, INTER VIEW 11-26 (1983). See also J. HILLMAN, RE-VISIONING PSYCHOLOGY
(1977); J. HILLMAN, THE MYTH OF ANALYSIS (1972).
J. HILLMAN, INTER VIEWS 11-12 (1982).
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riority-something sensitive, something ... well pathologized.
Soul makes the ego feel uncomfortable, uncertain, lost. And
that lostness is a sign of soul. You couldn't have soul or be a
soul if you couldn't feel that you have lost it. The Person in
the strong ego, as it's called, doesn't feel he's lost any-
thing .... We have to concentrate on making soul out of the
lost and interior conditions."
Hillman's notion of pathologizing takes us beyond the simple
idea of failure. Pathology is not something that happens to us,
or something we do, or a particular state. Hillman suggests that
"its there all the time! The pathology is the place that keeps the
person in the soul, the torment, that twist that you can't simply
be naive, you can't simply go along in a natural way, that
there's something broken, twisted, hurting, that forces constant
reflection-and work." 74 To pathologize the profession is to seek
its soul, to take account of the dark underside, the realm of
strong personal feeling, the experience of going astray and fail-
ing. A pathology of professionalism seeks out the personal,
human face of action and inaction, for these too are an integral
part of professional life.
The professional self-image we promote in the profession
and in professional education is built around a strong ego, an
ego that fuses cognitive manipulation of knowledge with the
skills of a "doing self," a heroic ego that denies defeat and
failure. Ego consciousness promotes a traditional professional
identity which walls off professional and personal selves, and
diverts us from the reservoir of feelings and sentiments that
make a person complex, rich and soulful as well as a human
tool that performs professional services for a fee.
The idealized professional self-image is rooted in an omnip-
otence fantasy which resists the feelings and failures that make
soul possible. The soul of professionalism comes from the inte-
riority, the reflectiveness of a self that can feel the failing, the
weakness, the uncertainty, the subjectivity and the "softness"
which permeate professional work. In feelings of helplessness,
powerlessness, inadequacy and the fear of failure lie both the
pathology and the heart of professionalism. Pathologizing
" Id. at 17.
" Id. at 23.
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professional work and professional life helps me extend myself
into the craft and become a part of what I produce. In pathol-
ogizing professionalism we see how professional ethos and ideal-
ized images of lawyering are an incomplete vision, a vision
without soul.
Craftsmanship is perverted by the obsession for techniques
and strategies-"tricks of the trade." Although these strategies
and tricks are contained in the notion of craftsmanship, but
they are not the container itself-they are not craft. We need a
better sense of what it means to work at a craft and to have
craft to turn to. We should seek to become mindful of self as
craftsperson. We will also need a sense of how failure is possible,
the failure one experiences in infinite beginnings, in the pathol-
ogy and craziness of professional work. It is then that we begin
to see the deeper meaning of professionalism and the true task
of applied ethics.

